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This case raises the question whether there is a 14th

-

amdt right to adequate treatmenf for persons civilly camnitted
i n staee mental institutions. Justice Blackmun's statement
in Jacksol1 v. Indiana that due process requires "that the

nature and duration of commitment b ear some reasonable
relation ship to the purpose for which the individual is
committed"

seems to suggest that there might be, and Juage

Wisdom drew on a considerable body of scholarly opinion in

-

formulating a theoritical model

- · --

.

.

.--....----.

--

alll that declares such a right.
,

I am inclined to await ...l!ll!~ more

lower courts before taking a case.

consideration in the

The notion of defining a

...,

-

r - ....

-

~

constitutional right by reference to some standard of medical
care is quite troublesome to me . As medical knowledge changes
the

constitutional right would also prestnnably change.
b,,&.CA.~'4..

CA 5 had a relatively easy

~aseA•

•I

i the difficult

problem of defining what was "adequate" did not really
pose a pro~lem.

The court was able to treat the issue -

more or less as a malpractice "tfl.lestion and determine, by
comparison to general medical standards,that the care provided
here was far less than adequate.

I would prefer to wait and see how the lower courts
fare in defining

-

" adequate" treatment •

and implementing

guidelines to assure that right. Wyatt v. Stickney,q1emtioned
on the last page, is a case that comes closer to this problem,
but even there the parties apparently stipulated a level of
Other cases might arise
care that all would consider adequate .A1 --~
that really grapple
A. with this pro~lem in a true adversatial
context,and such cases would seem to provide this Court ~
much-needed education before it sets off down this difficult
path.
David

-
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~
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Sunrrner List 17, Sheet 2

Cert to CA 5

No. 74-8

(Wisdom, Rives, Morgan)

O'CONNOR

Federal/Civil

v.
DONALDSON

1.

Timely

-

Petitioner seeks certiorari to review CA S's

determination that . the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
mentally ill persons civilly corrnnitted in state mental

-------~--------

hospitals a right to treatment, and ~hat state officials'
intentional, malicious, and reckless disregard of that right

,---- --

-

gives rise to a cause of action for damages under ~

-

-

-

2.

Although some federal district courts recently have found
a right of treatment for civilly committed mentally ill
patients, see Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), 344 F. Supp. 373, appeal docketed sub~, Wyatt v.
Aderholt, (5th Cir. Aug. 1972); Stachaulak v. Coughlin, 364
F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); but see Burnham v. Department
of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, appeal docketed (5th
Cir. Oct. 1972), this appears to be the first court of
appeals decision reaching that conclusio; . 1

-

-

0 95 ~

2.

Surrnnary:

Respondent was civilly committed in

fter having been diagnosed .a paranoid schizophrenic.

The1udge told him that he was being sent to the hospital
for a "few weeks" to take some new medication and that he
was certain that respondent would be "all right" and would
return soon.

Respondent, a Christian Scientist, refused to

submit to medication or electroshock therapy.

He

---...

1. Additionally, Welsch v. Likins recently recognized
a similar right on behalf of civilly committed mentally
retarded patients. 4-72-Civ. 451, D. Minn. (Feb. 15, 1974).

-

-

-

was not released until 1971.

~

/ I+-~

3.

-=------- ---------

Respondent thereafter sued five officials of the
state mental facility, all~ging that they had ''acted in bad
faith . . . and with reckless disregard of his constitutional
rights."

The core of the charge was that two of the defendants
.

had acted intentionally and maliciously in "confining
[respondent] against his will, knowing that [he] was not
physically dangerous to himself or others."
were acquitted.

Three defendants

Rejecting their defense that they had acted

in good faith and reasonable belief that r espondent needed
confinement and that the confinement was legal, the jury
-

returned a verdict of $17,000 compensatory damages and $5,000
punitive damages against petitioner

O'Connor, and $11,500

compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages against -another
defendant.

Petitioner, represented by the Florida Attorney

General, seeks certiorari to review the CA 5 affirmance of
that verdict.
Decision Below:

CA 5 reviewed the evidence at some

length and concluded that~ amply suf~ced to support ~the

------

jury verdict.

This review occupies some fifteen pages of

the CA 5 slipsheet opinion.

In general terms, it indicates

that officials devoted very little attention to respondent
following his refusal to submit to medical or electroshock

ce

therapy, and that they refused repeated requests to release
respondents to persons who volunteered to be responsible for

-

-

4.

his care.

CA S's view of the evidence indicated that it

supported jury findings that the defendants unjustifiably
withheld specific forms of treatment from respondent;
that they recklessly failed to attend to and treat respondent
at the precise junctures when treatment would have most ~
aided his recovery and release; that they wantonly,
maliciously, or oppressively blocked efforts by responsible

;

organizatj>ns and friends to have him released to their
custody; that they continued to confine him with knowledge
or reckless disregard that he was not dangerous; and that

-

'

they failed to do the best job they could with the available
resources.
../

Petitioner's appeal in the Fifth Circuit challenged

the basis of the 1983 action, asserting that patients
civilly con:n:nitted in state mental hospitals do not have a
constitutional right to treatment.

----------- - -----

CA 5 concluded that the

Fourteenth .Amendment provides such a right.
CA 5 begins with the obvious proposition that civil
con:n:nitment results in the kind of deprivation of liberty
that gives rise to due process concerns.

Relying on the

considerable amount of scholarly work in the area, it then
constructs a two part theory supporting the conclusion that
persons civilly connnitted have a right to · treatment.

-

theory begins with the ptopositiori that all nontrivial

The

'

-

-

5.

deprivations of liberty m~st be justified by some permissible
government goal.

Continuing, CA 5 identifies three distinct

grounds for civil corrnnitment that typically are recognized
person
by state statutes; protection of thefcorrnnittef; protection
of others; and recognition of the need for treatment, care,
custody, or supervision.
715, 737 (1972).

See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.

These basic state interests, in the opinion

of CA 5, canjbe
9 ,categorized more broadly a ~
2.,

rationale
an
...,_
___,

police power

'

parens patriae rationale.

CA 5 determined that confinement in this case rested
on the parens patriae rationale that the patient was in

4t

need of treatment.

In that context, due process requires

provision of "minimally adequate" treatment lest corrnnitment
on the parens patriae rationale amount to an arbitrary exercise
of government power.

,,
11

The second part of the CA 5 theoretical model did not
depend on the distinction between those corrnnitted on the parens
patriae rationale and those corrnnitted pursuant to the state's
police power.

The court determined that in cases lacking

the three central limitations on the state's power of
detention -- that it ~e in retribution for a specific offense;
that it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted
only after a proceeding where fundamental procedural safeguards

-

are ~rovided -- the state must justify confinement by provision

-

-

6.

of some quid pro quo.

In this instance, the required quid pro quo

was adequate treatment.
Finally, CA 5 was able to avoid the argument that the
concept of adequate treatment lacked judicially manageable
s-t;andards.

M
/}

It determined that the record in this case so

clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of respondent's treatment
that a ruling could be reached without more complicated
formulation of the abstract notion of adequacy.
4.

Contentions:

Petitioner first asserts that the

Fourteenth Amendment does not confer a right to adequate
treatment to those civilly committed in state mental institutions.
-

The argument on this point relates in part to the absence of
recognition of such a right in the historical evolution of
'

civil commitment.

It additionally emphasizes the problems

of defining and implementing a standard of adequate treatment.
Petitioner additionally asserts that the Court should

--

grant cert to consider whether, if a right to adequate
treatment exists, respondent waived the right by refusing to
Finally, petitioner
·- ---urges
that physicians in state mental institutions should not
submit to medication and electroshock.

be held liable under 1983 for any conduct other than bad
faith or malicious deprivation of adequate treatment.
5.

-

Discussion:

As CA 5 pointed out, the jury was

instructed that it should not award damages for failure to
provide treatment that respondent refused to accept.

-

-

-

7.

Petitioner did not object to the instruction at trial.
439 F. 2d at 531.

This would appear to remove some of the

force from petitioner's assertion that the Court should review
the waiver point.

Petitioner's assertion that a damage

action should not lie for conduct other than bad-faith
or malicious deprivation of rights has some appeal on these
facts.

The doctors. involved were clearly part of a state

system that warehoused mental patients, and some of the
actionable conduct appears to have taken place long before
there was any social concern for this practice or any reason
to foresee the evolution of an actionable constitutional
right to adequate treatment.
-

However, the unchallenged jury

instruction required a finding for petitioner if the jury found
that his actions were taken in good faith.

Moreover, CA 5

found sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive
· damages on the basis of malicious or wanton conduct.

The

major question, whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides
persons civilly corrnnitted in state institutions a right to
adequate treatment is a question that this Court obviously
will have to resolve at some point in the future.

This is

a thorough and complete attempt to justify such a right,
and the only question is whether it would be preferable to
wait to allow other circuits to grapple with the problem
before addressing the issue.

-

-

-

...... . .

-

8.

There is a response.

September 11, 1974

Boyd

CA op in app.
CA op also at
493 F. 2d 507

Wyatt v. Stickney, under submission in CA 5, illustrates
another aspect of this complicated problem. There the court
conducted hearings on the medical question of treatment and
concluded by promulgating standards that define the
constitutional minimum level of treatment of the civilly
committed. 344 F. Supp. 373.

-
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The Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to review that c ourt1 s

ruling that the 14th Amend. guarantees persons civilly committed in state mental
hospitals a right to treatment.
Petr now moves, pursuant to Rule 36(8), to be allowed to dispense with the

])0 requirement of an Appendix and to proceed on the original record.

Petr, pleading

efficiency and economy, states that the appendix, as designated, would have to
include substantially the entire record, some 1,200 pages.

,·

-

-

- 2 -

Resp has filed a m e morandum in opposition arguing that since both parties

-

intend to refer to substantial portions of the record and because the Court may
wish to review the relevant evidence to determine the proprietary of the jury1 s
verdict, an appendix is necessary for the conv enience of the Court.

Resp notes

that while. most of the testimony at trial will be in the appendix, there has bee n
11

a genuine effort by counsel for both parties to pare the record of its essenti a ls.

11

DISCUSSION: It is possible that the parties do not understand the purposes o f
.an appendix.
inclusion of

Rule 36(1) sets forth certain required contents and provides for the
11

any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to d i rect t h e

court1 s particular attention.

11

See also Rule 17.

I understand that the emphasized

language was a carefully chosen revision to the former rules which requi red the
parties to designate the parts of the record

-

consideration of the questions presented.
Rule 36(3) admonishes that

11

11

necessary 11 or

11

material 11 fo r t h e

Stern & Gressman at 440-41.

In addi tion,

the parties shall have regard for the fact that the re cord

on file ~ith the Clerk is always available to the court for reference and e x a m i natio n
and shall not engage in unnecessary designation.

11

And, of course,

11

the fact that

any part of the record has not been printed shall not prevent the parties or the c ourt
from relying on it.

11

Rule 1 7.

See also Rules 26 and 29( 3 ).

The Advisory Committee 1 s Note to Rule 30(a) of the Fed. R. App. P. make s
clear that the appendix is not to contain the entire record but merely a se lecti o n
therefrom for the convenience of the court.

See Stern & Gressman at 428 n. 1.

It

does not appear that permitting the parties to proceed on the original record , or
of reproducing the entire record in an appendix, would be in keeping with the pur-

-

poses and intent of the appendix method.

If petr 1 s motion is denied, perhaps it

would be appropriate to invite the parties 1 attention to Rule 36(3).
The Clerk is conferring with the parties.

They may reach an agreement as

to the appendix and th e motion may be withdrawn.

It is not clear, however, that

-

- 3 -

the appendix will be reduced in size.

-

-

-

There is a response.

11/27/74
PJN

Ginty

-

Court

•

•

-

Conference 12-6-74
Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 74-8

O'CONNOR
vs.

Mo,1otJ

DONALDSON

~

•

~

HOLD
FOR

CERT.

Powell, J ................ ,.... .
Blackmun, J .............,.... .
Marshall, J ............ ..,.... .

•

White, J .................,.... .

Stewart, J ...............,.... .
Brennan, J...............,.... .
Douglas, J . .. .............,.... .

Burger, Ch. J ............,.... .

MERITS

MOTION

AB-

INOT_

1---...---+--~--...--~--+-~--+--~---1sENT VOT
0

Rehnquist, J .............,... . .

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

D

N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

G

D

ING

':

-

jk/ss

-

1/14/71

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein
No. 74-8

DATE:

January 14, 1975

O'Connor v. Donaldson

This is the Court's first foray into the world of civil
commitment, an area presenting difficult and troubling problems.
Since there is little doubt that this will not be the Court's
sole effort in the next several years, I have written
(hurriedly, unfortunately) a somewhat extended memorandum so
that this case may be placed in a more general context.

I

will use the following outline:

-

I. A Sketch of the Existing Situation.
II. The Legal Pr0blems Presented
III. My Thoughts As to Solutions
IV. The Present Case
I

There are numerous people who have been and are being
involuntarily committed to state mental hospitals.

With few

exceptions, mental patients are committed for indefinite
periods on the basis of abbreviated legal proceedings.

The

hospitals in which they are placed are poorly situated,
inadequately staffed, oversized and unpleasant.

Often they

are not much different from prisons and, indeed, prisons
frequently give inmates more privileges because inmates are
more rebellious and demanding than mental patients.

-

-

-

2.

Traditionally the state's power to commit is divided
into its parens patriae power - those who need care and
treatment - and its police power - those who are dangerous.
Until recently most commitment statutes relied on the state's
relatively unchallenged parens patriae power.

In the past

few years, however, and in the wake of some judicial proddings,
at least 25% of the states have amended their statutes to

----

-

limit confinement to those who are dangerous to themselves
or others. ·k
,._

Once in a mental hospital, a patient receives little more
than custodial care and his daily drug dosages.
electroshock therapy is also given.

-

On occasion,

More traditional therapies,

such as psychotherapy, occupational therapy and behavioral
therapy are, to a large extent, non- existent.

A patient

dissatisfied with his commitment can file a writ of habeas;
however, the practical worth of such writs is nil since court~
appear to be powerless to review the justificationSfor
commitment.
II
As a result of these circumstances numerous legal
challenges have been filed in federal courst in recent years.
Generally these challenges have been of £our types:
·kTfie "danger to self" justification obviously partakes of
both the police power and parens patriae rationale.

-

?

-

A.

-

3.

Abolition or limitation of the parens patriae power.-

Several suits have been brought challenging the state's power
to commit people solely on the ground that such people need
care.

In short, the thrust of these cases has been that civil

commitment is in the nature of a penal sanction and therefore
that the state can commit, if at all, only pursuant to its
police power.
B.

Procedural due process. -

Concommitant with the

challenge discussed in "A" above has been a claim that since
the state may rely only upon its police power, it must provide
criminal procedures - counsel, jury trial, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt - before it may commit someone.

Some cases

have argued that, no matter what power the state purports

-

to rely on for c ommitment, the nature of the sanction requires
the use of criminal procedures.*
C.

Right to treatment. - A number of suits, most notably

Wyatt v. Aderholt, decided by district judge Frank Johnson
and recently affirmed by CA5, have been class actions reque sting
federal courts to impose constitutionally required mi nimum
procedures on state hospitals.

For example, federal courts

have ordered states to achieve a certain doctor-patient ratio,

4o

adopt individual treatment plan/ s, reviewable in federal court,
i(The issue discussed in "A" and "B" were presented in lessard
v. Schmidt which this Court remanded last year but is now back
up here. That case involves a three-judge court's invalidation
of a commitment statute.

-

-

-

4.

and to maintain certain physical conditions within the facilities.
In general, courts have ordered such requirements for all
patients, irrespective of whether they have been committed
under parens patriae or police power.

One question that has

been left open in these right to treatment suits is whether
the right is enforceable by means of habeas, damage ~ or both,
and in what circumstances.
D.

Right to refuse treatment. -

Most recently a new

constitutional right has been claimed - the right to refuse
treatment.

In particular people have objected to the use

of experimental therapies or extremely intrusive forms of
treatment such as lobotomy, electroshock therapy and behavior

-

modification.

Obviously the co-existence of a right to

treatment with a right to refuse treatment leads to a logical
and administrative strain.
III
Given this situation, the question is:
it?"

"What to do about

Before answering this, let me set forth some observations

based on my study of this area.

These observations are not

unassailable "facts" but I do think they represent fair
evaluations of the existing knowledge.
A.

The distinction between the police power and the

parens patriae power is largely a red herring.*

-

The empirical

*I am assuming here that we · are talking about non-criminal
mental patients - i.e. those who are civilly committed.

-

-

data overwhelmingly support

s.

the following two conclusions:

first, the incidence of dangerous behavior among the mentally
ill - in particular, among those who are committed - is no
greater than it is in the population at large; second, there
is no reasonably accurate way for psychiatrists (or anyone
else) to predict which people are dangerous.

Countless

c ) ~ ~ cJI.JL,... ~ e+ , B

psychiatrists have candidly admittedtTia'f[they will ~ay a
person may be dangerous if they believe that person is "in
need of treatment" even though they have no idea whether the
person is dangerous.

The American Psychiatric Association

made this point in their brief in this case, a cknowledging
that dangerousness cannot be identified with any accuracy.

-- -

~

-

In short, those who argue that only people who are

-

dangerous should be commitable are arguing for an abolition

----

of civil commitment.
~

-

Hence, although there is a nice

analytic distinction between parens patriae and police power,
there is no pragmatic difference worthy of re c ognition.*
*Indeed, even assuming that we could identify those who are
mentally ill and dangerous, a serious constitutional issue
is presented as to whether such people may be confined i.e. preventively detained. With respect to society at
large we await a criminal act before confinement. Why
then limit preventive detention to the mentally ill ?

-

~

~~, >/

B.

-

6.

People presently in non-criminal mental hospitals

generally may be broken down into two groups.
are those whom I call the "unwanteds."

First there

Usually these are

people, such as the aged, that a particular family considers
to be a drain and therefore has committed so as to absolve
themselves of responsibility.

(As an interesting sociological

parenthetical, I note that the b~ akdown of family responsibility
in this country is undoubtedly responsible for a sizeable
portion of forced mental patients.)

Second, there are nomad

types who wander aimlessly and come into contact with the

-

police, generally as vagrants, and who seem disoriented.
Such people are taken to mental hospitals and sometimes remain

-

for a long time.

Some of these people have evidenced rather

serious symptamology such as suicide attempts.
C.

There is no doubt that many, although not all,

mental patients are capable of making many rational decisions.
Mental illness frequently has only a sporadic and/or partial
effect on the thought processes.

Moreover, there is little

question that at least some (or perhaps many) of those who
are involuntarily confined could function on the outside.
By this, I mean that they are able to take care of their
own needs and capable of living a life that is not dependent
upon the state for survival.
D.
myth.

-

Treatment in a mental hospitals is somewhat of a
Drug treatment (thorazine, etc.) is readily available

and is given on a wide scale.

Shock treatment is also

-

-

•

available although used less frequently.

7.

(These forms of

treatment, however, typically do not necessitate confinement).
Beyond these treatments, most forms of treatment are
exceptionally costly andJ unless states are willing to increase
their expenditur es dramatically, it will be useless to speak
of meaningful treatment at this time.

Moreover, many people

who are mentally ill are "incurable" under present treatment
modalities.*
Given these "realities," I think the preferred solution,

j<Y~

v~~

>

-

-

--

and one toward which you should look in the instant case, is
to restrict the state's power to commit involuntary mental
..._

patients.

Basically, what needs to be done is to limit the

'--------'

number of people confined and the duration of their confinement.
First, I would require that prior to commitment the state show
that an individual is either:

(1) incapable of caring for

himself on the outside; or (2) unable, as a result of his
mental illness, to make a reasonable judgment as to whether
to accept treatment.

In the first circumstance, I think that

the state may keep people as long as necessary although it
should be under an obligation to attempt, where possible,
to assist the person to recover so as to be able to return
*All of this may change with the development of behavior
modification which seems to "work" more effectively than
traditional psvchotherapies. It is worth noting, however,
that there has been, a strong reaction against forced
behavior modification.

-

-

to the outside.

-

8.

In the second circumstance - where it is

assumed that the person is able to function on the outside I think that a time restriction, such as six months, should
be placed on the length of confinement. *
not have a deleterious effect.

Such a result will

Indeed, California has enacted

a statute placing a 90-day limit (and in many instances less)
on the length of commitment.
is working rather well.

Reports indicate that the system

One effect has been that people agree

t o voluntarily commit themselves since they know that they
can then leave if they so desire.
The alternative to the approach I recommend is to allow
things to remain as they are which I think would be unfortunate.

-

At least some people who could live acceptably on the outside
are being needlessly c~nfi~ed.

And, i-nevieaely , large scale

~ tin
•

cases sue h as Wyatt v.

Aderholt, discussed above, where the federal courts get into

I

the unseemly business of running state mental hospitals.
"'-

This, in turn, no doubt will lead to extensive litigation
(as ha~ been going on at the district court level for a number

of years) elaborating on the right to treatment and deciding
~~

when it has ~

-

Moreover, at least some consideration

must be given to the issue of what happens if treatment is
not forthcoming:

Is the patient released?

Even if he cannot

cope on the outside?

-

*Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, provides some support
for this kind of approach.

-

e

-

9.

Since this appears to be an intractable mess, and somewhat inevitable mf the status quo is not altered, I am
hesitant to see the Court take a plunge into the right to
Thus, in my view, Donaldson's case should be

treatment.

-?

considered a "right to release" case.

In that regard, it

\ fits a more traditional mode of analysis and keeps the federal
courts at a proper arm's distance with

~~ to

state

institutions.

IV
Donaldson was a fifty-year-old man at the time of his
commitment.

-

Prior t ~

albeit not gloriou~ life.

e he had lived a reasonably normal,
He had no criminal record and

only a brief three month mental commitment some fourteen years
earlier.

He had a substantial work record, and had been married

for a while and had children.

He was living with his parents

when, for reasons that are not clear in the record, his father
sought to have him committed.

At a "hearing" (of the substance

mandated in Goss) the trial court told him that he would be
committed only for a few months.

He was placed on a locked

ward with virtually no space to himself and with a population
that was one-third convicted criminals.

For almost fifteen

years he frantically attempted to secure his release.

He

filed 15 habeas writs, wrote countless government officials

-

and studied the law at lengt h.

The state hospital turned

-

-

10.

down efforts to secure custody by a halfway house with an
excellent reputation and J~ close friend who was a responsible
citizen.

After filing this suit as a class action, Dona ldson

was released (perhaps to defeat the class action . )

Since his

release he has functioned well and for a part of the time
has been gainfully employed.

He is now close to 70 years old.

Under the instructions of the court in this case, the
jury was required to find that Donaldson was not dangerous,
would have been able to care for his basic needs on the
outside and was receiving no treatment to speak of.

~~

~
_.,,.,,---

-

On these

facts I would hold that Donaldson had a right to be released

--

i r respective of the treatment he was receiving.

-

Indeed, if

a psychiatrist talked with him for an hour each day for these
fifteen years I would still think he had an absolute right

r

to be released since he was obviously not dangerous and was ~

able to live on the outside.
'-

To me this is the preferred disposition of this case.

--

GAS, unfortunately, did not rest on this ground.
'-----

-----

Rather

it found that Donaldson had a right to treatment and that
the evidence supported the jury's conc lusion that he had
been denied that right.

Nevertheless, this Court may affirm

a decision below on the basis of a different theory.

The

critical jury instructions in this case were )first )that the
plaintiff was required to show:

-

~

-

-

-

11.

"That the defendants confined Plaintiff against
his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill
or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he
was not receiving treatment for his alleged
mental illness. "·k
This instruction is, I think, more generous than petitioner
deserved.

It' does,
however, allow a jury verdict for the
--

plaintiff solely on a finding that if Donaldson was mentally
ill "he was not receiving treatment."

might allow a

Thus, the instruction

verdict solely on the grounds of treatment and,

therefore, compel the Court to reach that issue.

There was,

however, a second instruction:
-~

-

"If the jury should believe • . . that the
Defendants reasonably believed in good faith
that detention of Plaintiff was proper for the
length of time he was so confined then a verdict
for Defendants should be entered even though the
jury may find the detention to have been unlawful."
In light of this instruction, the jury nrust have found that
petitioner did not "reasonably believe" that Donaldson's

detention was lawful.

Hence I think you could affirm the

below on the basis of a right to release rationale.

if\
1

J

If you feel it is necessary to reach the treatment issue either because you think that, given treatment, Donaldson
could be confined or because of the posture of the case I

then I think that you should find such a right here.

-

If

Donaldson could be confined) the state's justification must
be treatment since no other justification is sustained by
~",The court went on to instruct that there is a "constitutional
right to treatment."

-

-

the record.

-

12.

This being so, Jackson v. Indiana constitutionalizes

this requirement by requiring that "the nature and duration of
connnitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose f or
which the individual is connnitted."
Petitioner implicitly accepts this analysis but argues
nonetheless that the right to treatment is too uncertain and
amorphous and, therefore, should not be justiciable.

Although,

as I have made clear above, I see problems with a constitutionally
cognizable right to treatment - and a good deal of litigation
in the wake of such a holding

---

I think if there is no right

to release there must be a right to treatment.

Otherwise

the states may confine someone forever on the ground that

-

they are "in need of care" without any form of judicial
intervention.

I also note that numerous amici representing

virtually all mental health professionals in this country
agree that there is a justiciable right to treatment consisting
of humane conditions, individual treatment plans and specific
doctor-patient ratios.

Indeed, Florida itself has enacted a

"right to treatment" statute-;\- and if the right is statutorily
cognizable I can hardly see how petitioner can claim it is
non-justiciable.

Finally, I note that, although psychiatry

is not a very exact science, if it is a science at all,
many judicial determinations - e.g., incompetency, not
guilty by reason of insanity, etc. - turn on psychiatric

-

*See also amici briefs of New Jersey and Ohio in this case
agreeing that there is a right to treatment :

-

testimony.

-

13.

Thus, there is nothing novel about a right that

rests, in part, on psychiatric judgments.

.

The last issue in this case is th~ question of damages.*
If you decide the case on "release" grounds then I think there
is no serious problem regarding "retroactive" application
of a new constitutional right since the right to release is
a t ypical due process right.
Assuming, however, that the right to release in these
circumstances is considered a new right or, alternatively,
assuming you view this case ~

a right to treatment case,

then I think petitioner's argument is somewhat persuasive.
As a general matter I do not think that a state official
should be held for violating/~onstitutional right that was

-

\ not recognized at the time of his behavior.

-

Nevertheless, on the facts of this case I think you could
affirm the judgment of damages for several reasons.

Most

-,\-Petitioner also claims respondent "waived" his right
to treatment since respondent refused to accept drugs or
electroshock on the ground that he was a Christian Scientist.
The jury, however, was instructed, as requested by petitioner,
that "if Plaintiff through his own actions contributed to
the withholding of a particular form of treatment, that
Plaintiff is not entitled to collect compensation . • •
for the failure to give such treatment during the particular
period or periods Plaintiff refused such treatment." In
view of this instruction, and petitioner's failure to raise
this argument in CAS, . I think the issue is not worthy of
consideration here.

-

-

-

importantly, petitioner did not
on retroactivity nor did he
this ground.

14.

a jury instruction
to the instructions on

Moreover, petitioner did not raise this issue

in CA5 (although a different defendant did raise the issue.)
Hence) to justify reversa1; the issue would have to be
cognizable as plain error even though it was raised in this
Court for the first time.
factors worthy of note.

There are also several other
First, t~

ju"9" ~·n truction on
/ ~f) J
immunity, quoted above, is ~excel ] ent. It requi ed the jury
") (!}/.~

to find that petitioner did not reasonably believe that
he had a lawful reason for confining petitioner.

Hence the

instruction would satisfy Scheuer and your dissent in Wood.

-

/second, the jury found actual malice and awarded punitive
damages.

Such a judgment is supported by the evidence since

petitioner refused to release Donaldson to the halfway house
and to Donaldson's friend although such release was plainly
justified.

Third, the damages awarded ($17,000 compensatory,

$5,000 punitive) were hardly unreasonable in view of the
duration of the confinement.

Finally, if the Court rules that

there is a right to release or to treatment in these circumstances, there will be no retroactivity problem in future
cases.

Thus, the argument that psychiatrists will be deterred

from working in state hospitals is no more viable than in any

-

-

' "

-

-

case dealing with qualified immunity.

15.

Only absolute immunity

can provide absolute i nsurance.*
In sum, since the Court can (perhaps should) avoid the
retroactivity issue here since it was not raised in any court
below, I would not decide it at this time.

J.K.
ss

*I also note that Florida, itself as part of its right to
treatment statute has created a rl.ght of recovery against
psychiatrists subject to a qualified immunity for good
faith.

-

-

-

-
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No. 74-8, O'Connor v.

tt
Donaldson (1/"4?/JS-)

I would affirm for the reasons stated herein. If you
than I am
are less comfortable/on the issue of damages, I would reverse
and remand as discussed.
Although I would affirm, I would not accept the "right to
treatment" ration.'"i1e of eA 5.

Rather, I would hold t hat~ on the

facts of this case -- not dangerous and able to provide on the
outside--, Donaldson was entitled to release irrespective of
whether he was receiv ing treatment.

This would still allow the

states to commit people who were dangerous and people who are
unable to care for thems elves.

In this latter circlllilstance~

the State has a legitimate parens patriae interest in providing

-

custodial care (preslllilably hlllilane), and need not provide "trea tment" as a constitutional matter since the jus t ification for
confinement is that the person needs custody.

(Obviously the

state has an interest in offering "treatment" if it is avai l able,
but that is a question for the state.)
Donaldson was not a person who needed custody, even though
he may,in some psychiatric sense,have been "mentally ill."

Nor,

as the jury found, was he in any way dangerous. Hence, I would
absolutely
hold that the due process clause/bars his involuntary confinement.
(He may, of course, receive treatment voluntarily, but then no
cons:i.tutitional issue is presented as he agreed to take whatever
is given.)

-

The damages issue is more difficult.

I am loathe to hold

thi s doct or for doing what everyone else was doing at this time.
Nevertheless, my study of the record has persuaded me that this
doctor did not do what everyone else was doing.

I think he

had an affirmative dislike 'of Donaldson and actually obstructed

-

~

-

•

Donal ~son's release knowing that it was not in the best interest
of the patient.

What little "treatment" that was available --

e.g., occupational thera py and grounds privileges -- were denied
Donaldson even though, given his I.Q. and ability, he would
have been a prime candidate.

Indeed, wh~n Donaldson eventually

was given a different doctor he ~eceived these bene f i ts.

Moreover,

and most telling for me, when two golden opportunities were
presented, petitiorFr'efused to allow Donaldson to go.

In both

cases -- a half way house of excellent repute and a personal
friend -- the conditions were far _ superior to those existing
at the state hospital, and there is little question that
Donal dson could have been cared for adequately at either place.

-

Thus, a carefully written opinion could make clear that
doctor's are not, and will not be, liable under 1983 for
doing the ordinary.

Only when they go beyond that, and engage

in activites that, even in the circLnnstances (Scheur),are
wholly ~n justif ied, will the be held liable.

To me this i s

such a case.
If you are

un persuaded, then I think you should remand the

case so that, under proper jury instructions, Donaldson may
.:::-=--.._.____

-

-·-·-·

be given an opportunity to show that this is such a case.
Otherwise, you would be, in effect, providing doctors a

-

fl

form of absolute innnunity whereas I think you statement of
Scheur in Wood should apply to doctors as well as school
Board members.
Finally, to round the picture out, let me note how I
would handle cases where commitment is justified -- i.e.,
where there is a showing of "dangerousness" or of "inabil ity
to care for ones e~f ."

As we agreed, prior to commitment, the re

-

.

-

•

should be a meaningful due process hearing.

After the initial

commitment, under the principles enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana,
the Court could require some periodic review -- e.g. yearly -although the

Court need not establish what time is " reasonable."

In this situation, the whole issue

of habeas, and to a large

extent , personal liability of doctors need have litt l e prospective
concern.

Similarly, what happens in the interim shoul d not be

a matter of constitutional law except where conditions are such

---

that confinement is "cruel and unus:ual."

(This would obviously

be a very limited consitutional ~nterest.)

There is no

constltutional right with respect to what happens while confined
because: (1) with respect to the dangerou~ f~ justification
for confirrmment is the police power which[ J~~

-

not require a

quid pro quo; and (2) with respect to those who are unable to
care for hhems eli::ves, the quid 9r o quo is custody.

Moreover, to

speak of treatment in such cases is a myth since we plainly

-------

do not know how to treat the dangerous (see recidivism rates), and
we almost as plainly are unable to treat the senile or others
who are unable to care for themselves.
The present case is, as I have sai d , neither of the above
situations.

Thus, it seems to me the only justificatt ion for

involuntary commitment would be some form of treatment.

But

as I prefer to let people such as Donaldson out of the hospital
before I would let the federal courts in, I would regret a right
to treatment and opt for what might seem to be a more expansive

-

-----

- -- ---------

right to relea~ e, but what in e f f ect will ha~ far less of
an impact on the states.

It will only require them to be

somewhat more careful before they civilly commit people.

\
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Supplemental List
No. 74-8
O 1 CONNOR

Motion of Resp for
Leave to File
Supplemental Brief
After Argument

v.
DONALDSON
Argument was heard in this case on January 15.
Because argument was advanced and heard only ten days after the filing of
re sp 1 s brief, petr requested and obtained leave to file a Reply Brief after argument.
The reply brief was filed February 5.
Resp urges that the filing of the reply brief after argument prevented him from
answering the Reply Brief during argument and he seeks leave to file the instant

-

brief in response.

e

.,
,.

'e

DISCUSSION:

- 2 -

Rule 41(6) provides that

11

•

[n]o brief will be received through

the Clerk or otherwise after a case has been argued or submitted, except upon
special leave.

11

The· Rules do not otherwise cover this unusual situation.

brief is concise and appears limited to responding to petr' s Reply Brief.

2/19/75
PJN

(-

-

Ginty

Re sp 1 s

Court

•

•

Conferel

2-21-75

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

74-8

O'CONNOR
vs.

DONALDSON

MOTION

)~

•

I

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

••••l•• i • • • • • • I • • • •

Rehnquist, J .............,.... .
Powell, J ................,.... .
Blackmun, J .............,.... .
Marshall, J ..............,.. . . .

•

• • • •

• • • t • · • •I•· • •

·· 11····
·· ~ ···

.........

White, J .................,.... .
Stewart, J ...............,.... .
Brennan, J...............,.... .
Douglas, J ... .. ...........,.. . . .
Burger, Ch. J ............,.... .

. -!.. ,....

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

I

NOT
AB- VOTSENT
ING

-

•

j)u:prttttt ~om± ttf tltt ~~ ;§htftg
'JlfrurlpngLm, ~. <q. 2llffeJ!. ~

CHA MBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 19, 1975

No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson
Dear Chief,
In due course I shall circulate a
dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

./) <;,
l.

/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/

~ Wt1AXL ~ ~ ~ ~
.§upr,nu Qj,rurl of !Ir• J!nit•b .§tat,s
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CHAMBERS Or

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 21, 1975

Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Chief:
I shall await Potter's dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

~V'--

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
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May 26, 1975

No. 74-8

O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Chief:
In view of the difficulty of the issue in this case
(at least for me), I will await other circulations before
deciding where I come down.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

I

~u:p-rtuu Qiourt of t!rt ~t~ ~h:tttg
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUST ICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 3, 1975

Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion
in this case.
Sincerely,

Ir~
Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to Conference

✓

June 4,' 1975

No. 74-8

O'Connor

v.

Donaldson

Responding to your memorandum of this date, perhaps I
should make two observations.
..
-

~ -~

:.r

~

-

·~

-~j

"",j
.

I have not yet had an opportunity to consider carefully
either your draft opinion or Potter's dissent. In view of
other work in progress here in my Chambers requiring my
~ttention, it may be another couple of days at least before
I refresh my recollection on the issues in this troublesome
case.
:
But at least as of now, I lean towara Potter's basic
approach - subject to reservations as to his reference to
a standard of liability based primarily on Strickland (which
I had hoped was focused on ~he particula~ case).

The <llief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

-

f

-

~u:pttntt Qfomt of tfrt ~~ .§taftg
~as!p:nghtn. ~- QI. 21lffe'!~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTI CE

Jun e 4, 1 9 75

R e: No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

MEMORANDU M TO THE CONFERENCE:

t11

Potter's proposed dissent furnishes a possible a v enue for disposing
of this case but it does not deal with a crucia l aspect should the Court of
Appeals remand for a new trial. In that sit uat ion we should deal with the
instruction that Donaldson had a " constitutional right" to treatment. I
believe a majority were of the view that no such right existed. It would
hardly be wise if a new trial were held and this instruction given anew if five here think it wrong.
The opinion I drafted was by no means my " first choice" disposition but an effort to develop a solution acceptable to a majority.
Meanwhile as we await reactions, I would add the following as a
footnote to page 8 of the draft, because the issue of possible dangerousness to self was not really submitted.

_!
Fairly read, the District Court's instructions provided
two overlapping theories upon which the jury could base a conclusion that respondent's alleged failure to treat petitioner
depriv ed him of a federally-protected right. First, the District
Court was of the view that if petitioner were mentally ill but not
'' dangerous to himself or others " the only justification for
cont inued hospitalization was to provide treatment; in such
circumstances his confinement would bear no relationship to
its purpose unless treatment were actually prov ided. Alternatively, regardless of the purpose of respondent's confinement,
the District Court unequivocally charged that he had a constitutional right to receive treatment which would give him a
realistic opportunity to improve. In both the Court of Appeals,

-

- 2 -

see 493 F. 2d, at 510, and this Court petitioner has attacked
only the broader instruction, and this refutes respondent's
argument that we must assume that the jury found him to be
non-dangerous. See Brief for Respondent 32.
Moreover, although the phrase "dange rous to himself or
others " was not defined in the District Court's instructions, the
testimony and other evidence at trial and the arguments of the
parties on this point make plain that for purposes of this litigation
it referred to a propensity for violence or similar physically
dangerous behavior rather than respondent's ability to function
in society. Cf. United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250, 257
(CA 2 1967). Compare Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (CA DC 1966).
This also seems to have been the understanding of the Court of
Appeals. See 493 F. 2d, at 51 7, 520.
Thus, even if the District
Court's first theory is read as a qualification of the second, it is
not correct that the jury's findings must have eliminated all of
the 11 traditionally asserted grounds for continued confinement
11
•••
,
ante at _ _ , and petitioner's challenge must be confronted.

I surely favor almost any disposition that clarifies the constitutional right as a right not to be confined as opposed to a "right to
treatment. 11
Regards,

~(>-

•

-

.:§n:prttttt <!Jcmri of lilt ~t::ib:h ,fictlts
:Wru;!r:ttghttt. la. 21\5 )1' ~

o;.

CHAMBERS OF

T HE CH I EF JUSTICE

Jun e 5, 1975

Re:

j

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v . Donald son

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have some further changes prompted by current memos
and will try to have a circulation out tomorrow..,. or Monday.
In my view even to give tacit approval to the instruction that
there is a "Constitutional right" to "realistically" effective treatment
will (a) leave the instruction binding on all district judges in the
largest circuit and (b) lead other courts to consider such an instruction
as required. That will bring us quite a volume of business as "jackleg"
lawyers begin to look for new fields to conquer.
The constitutional is sue is fairly presented and ought to be
met.
Regards,
t
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR .

June 5, 1975

RE: No. 74-8 O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissent in the above.

Sincerely,
,)

.

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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CHAM BERS OF

June 5, 1975

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-8, J. B. O'Connor v. Kenneth Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

. 11ir'
.
T. M •

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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CHA"1l3ERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson
In response to comments, I have made the indicated changes
in my dissent in this case.
As to the general approach to the case: The constitutional
problems raised by civil commitment of the mentally ill are many
and difficult. I remain persuaded that the Court should proceed
cautious_ly and deliberately in this area. The present case can be
decidedona-;arrow, though hardly trivial, ground- -i. e. that a person cannot be incarcerated, without more, merely because he is
mentally ill. · .
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The next question is, of course, ,vhether the State may
confine the mentally ill merely to facilitate treatment of their
illnesses. My inclinatiou. is to say no, · but it is not necessary to
reach that question here, and I.understand that some members of
the Court, before expressing even tentati\'e views on that subject,
would prefer ti) await a case that directly raises the issue. Thus
my dissent leaves the question open.

Further down the road is the question whether the State
can confine mentally ill persons, who have committed no crime,
merely on a p~i.on that they will act dangerously toward others.
Here we enter the difficult area of "preventative detention" of the
mentally ill. In what I take to be pure dictum, the Court of Appeals
suggested that such preventive detention is constitutionally permissible, but only if treatment is provided along with confinernent. The

-(

.

-

- 2-

constitutional arguments on all sides are novel and complicated.
They were not joined in this case; nor was there any need to join
them, for Donaldson was found to be non-dangerous .
I am opposed to plunging into these extraneous issues in
this case. In this delicate area, the Court should not act until it
has, through the adversary process, been made fully aware of the
conflicting arguments and practical considerations. I would therefo re dispose of the present case on its facts. The Court of Appeals
used the case as a vehicle for an expansive essay on the constitutional law of civil commitment. This was unnecessary, and perhaps
we should say so. But surely we should not make the same mistake.
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TO:
FROM:
No. 74-8

O'Connor v . Donaldson

The basic difference between the Chief Justice's
opinion and Mr . Justice Stewart's opinion is a dispute as to

- --Justice,

what issues are properly presented for review.
.--

-

,,..-.

The Chief

~

taking an expansive view of the proceedings below,

seeks to decide the broad question of whether an involuntarily
confined mental patient, whether or not he is dangerous,

-

has any due process right to treatment.

Justice Stewart

claims that this broad issue is not presented, and should not,
as well as need n ot be decided.

On Justice Stewart's reading

of the case the only issue presented is whether a state may
confine a mentally ill person solely on the ground tha t he
is mentally ill, and even though he is neither a danger
to himself or others nor is receiving treatment.
Stewart says "no" and the Chief Justice agrees.
p . 8, n . 6) .

Justice
(See 2nd Draft,

In Justice Stewart's memorandum of June 9, 1975,

he points out that his proposed resolution leaves open two
questions:

(1) whether a mentally ill person who is not

dangerous to himself or others may be hospitalized if he is

-

given treatment?, and (2) whe t her a mentally ill person who
is found to be dangerous must be given treatment if he is confined?

-

••

-

2.

It is this last question that has generated most of the
heat in this case.
In my view Justice Stewart's disposition is preferred
for three reasons:

(1)

properly read the record supports

his contention that only the narrow issue is presented;
(2) the broad issues considered by the Chief Justice raise
terribly difficult questions that have not been briefed in
this case and that require more reflection; and (3) the
Chief Justice's resolution of these broad issues is unpersuasive
even if one agrees with his conclusions.

-

I will address these

points in turn and then add some general comments at the end
which reinforce my conclusion that you should vote with Justice
Stewart.
1.

The critical jury instructions in this case were

delivered by the trial court as follows:
"You are instructed that a person who is
involuntarily civilly committed to a mental
hospital does have a constitutional right to
receive such treatment as will give him a
realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve
his mental condition.
Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization
is treatment and not mere custodial care or punish~
ment if a patient is not a danger to himself or
others. Without such treatment there is no
justification from a constitutional standpoint
for continued confinement unless you should also
find that the Plaintiff wa s dangerous to either
himself or others."

-

-

3.

-

The Chief Justice suggests that these instructions should
be read as alternative theories of liabil ity - that is,
that the first instruction provides a right to treatment for
all involuntary patients while the second instruction provides
such a right only for those who are not dangerous .

Justice

Stewart claims that the two instructions must be read together
and that if so read they provide that treatment need be
given only to those who are not dangerous.

Justice Stewart

seems correct because the alternative theory of liability
is illogical.

If all patients have a right to treatment,

whether dangerous or not, then why the limitations on the

-

right in the second instruction?

In view of this problem,

and particularly in a case such as this one where the
defendant did not object to the instructions on the grounds
suggested by the Chief Justice, and where the evidence clearly
supports a finding that Donaldson was not danger to himself
or others, I would go with Justice Stewart's reading.
This view is confirmed by the Court of Appeals although
it did so in an admittedly confused opinion.

~~

D1

Cl4 ~

----

The Court 2,f

-

Appeals
dangerous or
.,
.... did say that all
..... mental patients,
,_.
.........

..-:a

otherwise, have a right to treatment.

But I think such a

ruling is pure dictum as t h e court itself apparently is aware.
Only in the first part of its opinion, when it talks about
the parens patraie power - i.~., the right to conunit for the

-

patient's benefit and not because he is a danger

- does the

-

4.

-

Court of Appeals specifically refer to the facts of this
case.

Indeed the court explicitly states that "where, as

i n Donaldson's case, the rationale for confinement is the
parens patraie rationale."

Thus, that court appears to have

agreed with Justice Stewart's reading of the instruction.
To be sure, as the Chief Justice appropriately has
noted, the Court of Appeals went beyond the facts of this
case and reached out for the broad issue.

This is unfortunate,

iM..o~

de:rsta u d that Justice Stewart 4.: p:J.,rsui ·:rg t o eujpuL:u:e

~

a footnote making clear that he in noway approves this broad

-

ruling and, indeed, that because the judgment has been vacated

~1

s~

-/

on the damages question, the decision below has "no precedential
value . "

l

This is a rather unconventional technique but it

certainly cures the fear that the Court of Appeals> language in

\ DonaJ.dson will continue to haunt us.
2.

My view that Justice Stewart's reading of the record

should be accepted is buttressed by the fact that this Court
should, if possible, avoid the very difficult issues reached
by the Chief Justice.

Confinement of mentally ill people

on the ground that they may be dangerous raises, in my view,
some of the most difficult constitutional issues I have
encountered.
II

by dangerous.

Let me make clear what the state statutes mean
1i

•

They do not mean people who have committed

criminal acts; they do not mean people who have been acquitted

-

by reason of insanity; they do not mean people who are

-

-

-

5.

incompetent to stand trial.

Rather, they mean any person

who is "predicted" to conn:nit harmful acts in the future.
At the outset I note that this is a very strange notion in
our society - that is, that you can confine someone who has
done nothing unlawful simply on the ground that t wo
psychiatrists "predict" that he will be dangerous.

In short,

this is nothing more than preventive detention.
Such a system might make sense if indeed we could
predict which mentally ill peopie would be dangerous.

But

the simple and undisputed fact is, as the amicus have told us

-

in this case, there is no way to predict which mentally
i~l people are dangerous.

-studies

~

all the

~~-

....-

Contrary to the popular myth,

show that the incidence of dangerousness

among the mentally ill is no higher than it is in the
population at large.

Moreover, after spending a year in

California reviewing these studies, I am confident that trying
to distinguish a dangerous mentally ill person from a nonw~
dangerous one is, given the present state of the ~
an
impossible task.
In any case, one must also ask why we confine the mentally

r: J
-

ill who are allegedly dangerous while not confining others
in our society on the basis of predicted dangerousness.

If

two sociologists were to study ghetto teenagers and say that,
on the basis of their study, certain people were likely to be

-

6.

dangerous, our society would jump and scream if those
people were confined on the basis of that prediction.

Yet

t h is is precisely what we do with the mentally ill.
Let me suggest that the reason we do this for
the mentally ill is not solely because they are dangerous
but because, hopefully with treatment, their disease will be
cured and they will no longer be dangerous.

It is on this

ground that proponents of a right to treatment argue that if
the allegedly dangerous mentally ill people are to be confined,
absent a criminal act, they must be given treatment.

-

These are, it seems to me, very troubling questions.
Personally I am not sure how I would resolve them.

PerbJlis

the answer is to limit commitment to those who have actually
committed a harmful act.

In any case, these issues are barely

touched upon in the briefs in this case, and certainly should
not be decided without the fullest possible consideration.
3.

The Chief Justice's treatment of these issues . I

believj confirms my views.

✓

The Court of Appeals, as the

'~

t;-J ,;..

n retribution
for a specific offense; that it be limited to a fixed term;
and that it be permitted after a proceeding where the fundamental
procedures are observed."

-

None of these conditions attach to

the civil commitment of dangerous P.e~ple.

-

ii'

-

7.

But he fails even to discuss the problem of naked preventive
deterntion.

That issue simply cannot be ignored.

Hence if

you reach the dangerousness issue addressed by the Chief
Justice I think we must candidly address this difficult issue.
4.

Besides the reasons given above for joining in

Justice Stewart's opinion I think there are several other
problems with the Chief Justice's approach.

I

-

Most notably,

nowhere in his opinion does he say whether O'Connor violated
any of Donaldson's constitutional rights.

It seems to me

that unless that question is answered in the affirmative then
there is no possible way to affirm the judgment below, as

.,

the Chief Justice does.

O'Connor moved to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim.

Thus, if in fact he is correct

that he violated none of Donaldson's rights, this Court
should reverse the district court's failure to dismiss.

I

agree with Justice Stewart that Donaldson's rights were
violated and therefore his opinion washes.

But I do not see

how the Chief Justice can duck this basic issue .
I also think that the Chief Justice decides an irrnnunity
issue in a somewhat troubling way.

On page 8, at n. 5 of his

recent draft, the Chief Justice suggests that the damage
remedy should be affirmed because the jury found malice.

But,

as we have discussed, malice must relate to the deprivation of

-

constitutional rights; otherwise there is no§ 1983 action,
although there may be a malpractice suit.

The Chief Justice,

-

f

"

-

8

who finds no constitutional deprivation, suggests that
malice is enough.
Finally, I note that, as revised, Justice Stewart's views
on immunity salvage much of your concerns as expressed in
Wood v. Strickland.
For all of t h ese reasons, I strongly urge you to
join Justice Stewart.
concern:

I also add one further institutional

As the matter now stands Justice Stewart has four

votes and the Chief Justice has only himself.

Even if the

Chief Justice gets your vote, Justice Blac lanun's vote and
Justice Rehnquist's vote, he will still only have four since

-

Justice Douglas is sure not to join him.
case will be reargued.

Thus, at best the

In view of this consideration, there

is all the more reason to join Justice Stewart.

Joel

-

-

•-.

-
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CHAMB ERS OF

/

JUSTICE BYRON R . WH ITE

June 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

It is clear enough to me that this case was tried on
the basis that th ere was a right to treatment and that a
major issue was whether respondent was being treated. The
Chief Justice is surely correct that the instructions
informed the jury that there was a right to treatment; and
although there may be other bases for liability within the
boundaries of the instructions, as the case comes to us from
the Court of Appeals, the judgment against petitioner rests
firmly on the breach of duty to treat respondent.

l

There is thus much to be said for deciding the right
to treatment issue -- unless we are foreclosed from deciding it or may rationally avoid it. As to the latter
question, there is no issue here as to treatment for those
who are dangerous to others or to themselves (broadly
defined to include those who cannot take care of themselves);
for it appears to be admitted that respondent is not in this
category. This leaves those persons, such as respondent, who
are mentally ill but not dangerous to themselves or others.
Potter says that whether or not respondent had a right to be
treated, no treatment was given and respondent therefore
should have been released since the State may not confine a
person against his will solely because he is mentally ill.
So far I agree with him. But it should be understood that
his opinion decides that nondangerous, mentally ill pers ons
who a~~!19.t.. _be~I}_g _treated must be released and that in this
sense - Potteraealswi.1:fithe right to treatment issue -- at
least he is not disagreeing with the Court of Appeals' pronouncemen t insofar as persons in respondent's situation are

,.

-

.

- 2-

-

concerned.
I do not disa g ree with respect to that area
either, for if the St ate may confine solely for treatment,
i t should treat or release.
The difficulty is that if there is to be a new trial,
as I think there should be, at least to determine whether
p etitioner knew or should have known that he was violating
r espondent's constitutional rights, it is essential that
th e jury be properly instructed as to what respondent's
c onstitutional rights were and are. On this point, I agree
with the Chief Justice that the trial court's instructions
on the right to treatment were in some respects unsatisfactory and that they should not be repeated at trial.

I

· This leads me to the question whether a State may
con fine a nondangerous, mentally ill person solely for
tr eatment purroses.
If it may not do so, there woulctbe no
r~ n t issue in this case; the issue would be. ? p
solely whether petitioner -- mentally ill, but admittedly
v,
no t d angerous to himself or others -- knew or should have
known that confining respondent involuntarily violated his
constitutional rights whether or not treatment was furnished .
I would thus prefer to decide one of the questions Potter
l eaves open, namel¼whether a State ma confine a nondan ery vote at t econ erence was
/ ous person solel for therapy.
t
e Sae may not o so. Otherwis~ I shall remain where
Brother Stewart has · left me.

. R.W.
(,e fuU

I

-

I
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CHAM BERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1 975

Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v . Donaldson

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERE NCE:

We have all recognized from the outset that this is a most difficult
case. If, as Potter suggests, the Court of Appeals had adopted a strained
reading of the District Court's i n structions in order to write an es say re garding the supposed constitutional riglt-to-treatment, I would be with the
first to agree that we should emphati cally disapprove of its opinion and
decide this case on a narrower ground. However, after repeatedly going
ove r the record, I ~
,_i_n_ c_o_n_ v_i~~-c ed
____t_h_a_t _t_h_e_ C_ o_u_r_t_ o_f_A__,p'-'p~ e_a_l_s_'_in
_ te_ r..._p-=-r_e_t_ation of the instructions is correct . Thus, while I am open to some other
disposition w ich would not only vacate that court's judgment but leave
no doubt that the opinion is 11 washed out, 11 I continue t o believe that we
risk dis service to courts faced with claims such as respondent's if we do
not decide the right-to - treatment question . Admittedly , this aspect i s
complicated by the miserable performance of defense counsel -- so bad
as to be almost a denial of due process .

n

---

The District Court' instructions, regarding the constitutional
question in this case are reprodu c d in full and in proper sequence at
page 5 of my initial draft. Th~
t (respondent's proposed instruction
No. 37 ) was represented by four omission dots at page 5 of the dissent,
but could not be more unequivocal in stating_!__hat there is a constitutional
ri ht to effective psychiatric treatment for any involuntarily confined
mental patient. The secon instruction, which was taken substantially
from respondent's proposed instruction No. 38, does not purport to
qualify the first in any way . Specifically, it certainly does not state that
petitioner and his co-defendants had no constitutional obligation to treat
respondent if he were 11 dangerous to himself and others 11 ; in those cir cumstances they simply had no constitutional obligation to release him.
It seems to me that both the language of these instructions and the order
~

.., ,

-

•'

~

)

-

in w hic h they were giYen ::.-efute the :1otion that the fir s t merely 11 defined 11
the tr eatment to which respondent may have been entitled under the se cond .
See D iss ent , at Sa, n . 8 .
Th e mos t plaus ible interpretat i on i s that
elabor ated upon in footnot e 6 of my se c ond d r a ft, nam ely, that the Dist rict
Court was instructing the jury on alternative, alb e it overlapping, theo ries
of liab ility .
This interpretatio n i s reinforced by the D i s trict Court's comments
to t h e parties prior to giving i ts cha r g e to the j u r y . N ot surprisingly,
respo ndent proposed a numb er of i n stru cti ons relating t .o the constitutional
question in this ca se. One of them, No. 40, stated in pertinent part:
11
Even if a p e rson h as been lawfully committed to a mental hospital, he
retains the rig h t, inside ·the hospital, to receive adequate treatment. 11
The D ist r ict C our t refused this i n stru c t ion on the g round that it was
11
adequ a tely cov ered . 11 Tr . , at 705 .
Similarly, respondent's proposed
instruct ion No. 4l(b) stated:

1£ you believe that defendants withheld psychiatric treat me n t from plaintiff, or allowed his confinement to continue
know ing that he was not receiving adequate treatment, you may
find that his confinement was illegal under the federal constitu tion and the Civil Rights Act. 11
(Emphasis supplied . )
11

~
I

The District Court also refused this instruction, saying:
It is covered by No. 37 and No. 38 . 1 1 Ibid.

11

It is covered.

In my view, these comments and actions leave little room to doubt
that the District Court intended to instruct the jury that respondent's constitutional rights had been violated either if the doctors withheld treatment
from him or, if respondent was not dangerous, refused to release him
although knowing that he was not being treated. Petitioner has challenged
only the first of these theories, and it was the one with which the Court
of Appeals was concerned.

In any event, as foo t note 6 of my second draft states, the record
in this case makes abundantly clear that in the context of this litigation
the term 11 dangerou s 1 ' meant physically dangerous . The expert and other
testimony at trial used the term in this sense, the Court of Appeals did
as well, and the parties have perpetuated this usage in their briefs to this
Court. Thus, even assuming that the second of the District Court 1 s in structions somehow qualified the first, it is not correct to state that the
,

-

-

~

I

·•
I

'

- 3 -

-

jury necessar ily eliminated all of th e t raditional justifications for civil
commitme nt. The que stion w h ether : here is a con~ tutional ri gh t - t otre atment in the abs e n ce of pli s i cal dan erousness must theref or e b e
confr onte d and , i n parsing the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, is
dealt w ith in Part III.A. of my i n itial draft.

l
l

In sho rt, th e question whe ther there is a constitutional r ight - to treatment is fa irly presented by t h is case a n d that we relieve ou rse lve s
of no difficult probl ems, and i nde e d will cr e ate serious problems , by
brushin g i tund er the rug, unless, as suggested above,we make clear
that the op i ni on approving such instruction is no longer a valid holding
of the Court of Appeals.* I
At the very least, if this case is eventua lly
remanded for a new trial - - and the terms of Potter's proposed disposition make t h at a genuine possibility -- the need for " washing out 11 the
opinion will be very real.

Our " hang up, 11 it seems to me, is the proper disposition of this
specific litigation. As I stated in my memorandum to the Conference
of last Wednesday, the one proposed in my present draft is not by any
means my first choice and I am perfectly willing to consider alternatives
i\ so long as they make clear that the Court of A peals' opinion is not to
1 be cons1 ered precedent or the law of this case. If such a disposition
can be eveloped, I can go along with a remand. Otherwise, I believe
that we should decide the right-to-treatment is sue.

l

Regards,

~ -0
*I
Among (and within) the circuits there are differing views
regarding the precedential effect of opinions vacated on other grounds.

P. S.

The second draft of the opinion is " on the presses."
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.JU S TI CE PO TT ER STEWART
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June 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson

I propose to add the following footnote to my dissenting
opinion in this case, at the end of the final sentence:
15. The opinion of the Court of Appeals unnecessarily expresses views on difficult issues of constitutional law not presented by this case -- for example,
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves
or others have a right to treatment upon confinement by
the State. Our decision to vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals would deprive that court's opinion of ~
all precedential effect and leave this Court's decision
as the sole law of the case. Cf. United States v. Mun,
singwear, 340 U.S. 36.
-- •

w

Upon remand, the Court of Appeals would be free
to consider only the question whether O'Connor should
be held liable for monetary damages for violating Donald
son's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, on
substantial evidence and adequate instructions, that
there was such a violation, and that finding needs no
further · consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds
that a remand to the district court is necessary, the oruy
issue to be determined in that court would be wheth~il
O'Connor is immune from liability for monetary daix{ages.

P. S.

-

-
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CHAMBE RS O F

THE C HIEF JUSTIC E

Jun e 6 , 1 9 75

R e:

74 -8 - 0 ' Co nno r v . D onald son

MEMORANDUM TO THE CO N FERENCE:

=.

A revised draft of the above is at the printer.
That, with a response to Potter's June 6 dissent, will
be around late Mo n day.
Regards,

.._,.

t
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CHAMBERS 0~

JUSTICE W IL LIAM 0 . DOUG L AS

/

June 11, 1975
Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Since Bill Brenn':1 Byron, Thurgood,
and Lewis have already joined you, isn t your dissent
the basis for the Court opinion? If so, to avoid any
delay at this late hour, and if, as I assume, it is my
task formally to assign the opinion for the Court, I
assign, of course, to you.
Sincerely,
W.O.D.
Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

-

June 11, 1975

No. 74-8

O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

-
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 11, 1975

Re:

74-8 - 0 1 Connor v. Donaldson

MEMORANDUM TO. THE CONFERENCE:

Potter seems to have four and a fraction votes
(with Bi 11 Douglas not voting), and I am happy
to have him try his hand at an opinion. As I
stated, I can go a long with a- remand, but the
opinion must explain how a new trial can be
confined to the immunity issue.
Also can we
avoid passing on the correctness of the rightto-treatment issue in view of the CAS opinion
with its categorical approval of the District
Court instruction?
Bon voyage!

lD~rG,
"-<

•

•
June 11, 1975

No. 74-8

O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Chief:
Having now reviewed carefully everything that has been
circulated, I have concluded that this case properly can be
decided on the narrow ground that a state may not confine
a mentally ill person solely because of his illness, absent
danger to himself oro others. As I read the circulations,
you and Potter are of one mind on this issue.
Your opinion, however, proceeds to address the broader
issue of whether - and under what circumstances - there may
be a constitutional right to treatment. You make a
persuasive argument that the broader issue may be reached
in this case, but I remain unconvinced that it must be
reached. If I am correct in this, there are persuasive
prudential reasons for deferring decision until we have the
question in sharp focus and adequately briefed and argued.
It also seems to me that footnote 15, which Potter
proposes to add, would make it abundantly clear - indeed
painfully so to my Fifth Circuit - that the decision below
will have no precedential effect.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed
to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January of 1957. He was kept in· custody there against his will
for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor, was the hospital's s uperintendent during most of this period. Thro;.1ghout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release,
claiming that he was dar1gerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill,
and that, at any rate, the hosp ital wa s not providing treatment for his
supposed illness.

Finally, in February of 1971, Donaldson brought this

lawsuit under 42 U.S . C.

§

1983, in the ' United Stat es District Court for

-

-
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the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O'Connor, and other members
of the hospital staff, named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously
deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty ..l/

After a four day

trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding both compensatory and punitive
damages against O'Connor and a co-defendant. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O'Connor's
petition for certiorari, 419 U.S. 894, because of the important constitutional questions seemingly presented.
I.
Donaldson's commitment was initiated by his father, who thought
thathis son was suffering from "delusions." After hearings before a county
judge of Pinellas County, Florida, Donaldson was found to suffer from
"paranoid schizophrenia" and was committed for "care, maintenance, and
treatment" pursuant to now-repealed Florida statutory provisions

.2/

The state law was less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for
commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson's condition at the
time of the judicial hearing. The matter is, however, irrelevant, for this
case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but instead involves
the nearly fifteen years of confinement that followed.

-
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The evidence at the trial showed that the hospital staff had the
power to release a patient, not dangerous to himself or others, even if

3/

he remained mentally ill and had been lawfully committed.- Despite
many requests, O'Connor refused to allow that power to be exercised
in Donaldson's case. At the trial, O'Connor indicated that he had believed that Donaldson would have been unable to make a "successful adjustment outside the institution," but could not recall the basis for that
conclusion. O'Connor retired as superintendent shortly before this suit
was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson
secured his release and a judicial restoration of competency, with the
support of the hospital staff.
The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction,
that Donaldson had posed no danger to others during his long confinement,
or indeed at any point in his life. O'Connor himself admitted to having
no personal or second hand knowledge that Donaldson had ever committed
a dangerous act. There was no evidence that Donaldson had ever been
suicidal or likely to inflict injury upon himself. O'Connor's co-defendants
conceded that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the
hospital. He had done so for some fourteen years before his commitment,
and immediately upon his release he secured a responsible job in hotel
administration.

-
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Furthermore, Donaldson's frequent requests for release had
been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any care
he might need on release. In 1963, for example, a representative of
Helping Hands, Inc. a half-way house for mental patients, wrote O'Connor
asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The request was accompanied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry
and Neurology, which a defense witness conceded was a "good clinic."
O'Connor rejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released
only to his parents. That rule was apparently of O'Connor's own making.
At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, and, as O'Connor knew, Donaldson's parents were too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him.
Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson's parents,
O'Connor never informed them of the Helping Hands offer. In addition,
on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college
classmate of Donaldson and a long-time family friend, asked O'Connor
to release Donaldson to his care. On each occasion O'Connor refused.
The record shows that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person,
who was willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson's welfare.
The evidence showed that Donaldson's confinement was a simple
regime of enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate
or cure his supposed illness. Numer~rns witnesses, including one of

-
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O'Connor's co- defendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing
but custodial care while at the hospital. O'Connor described Donaldson's
treatment as "milieu therapy." But witnesses from the hospital staff
conceded that, in the context of this case, "milieu therapy" was a euphemism for confinement in the "milieu" of a mental hospital.~ For substantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in a large room that housed
sixty patients, many of whom were under criminal commitment. Donaldson's requests for ground privileges, occupational training, and an opportunity to discuss his case with O'Connor or other staff members were
routinely denied.
At the trial, O'Connor's principal defense was that he had acted
in good faith and was therefore immune from any award of damages.
His position, in short, was that state law, which he had believed valid,
had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the "sick," even if they
were not given treatment and their release could harm no one. _i_/
The trial judge instructed the members of the jury that they should
find that O'Connor had violated Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty
if they found that he had
"confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing that he
was not mentally ill or dangerous, or knowing that if

-
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mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his mental
illnes s . . .

..

. .

.

"Now the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treat.ment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a
patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without
such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional standpoint for continued confinement unless you
should also find that [Donaldson] was dangerous either

6/

to himself or others."-

The trial judge further instructed the jury that O'Connor was immune
from damages if he
"reasonably believed in good faith that detention of
[Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was
so confined . . . .

. . . . .
"[But] mere good intentions which do not give rise to
a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required
cannot justify [Donaldson's] confinement in the Florida
State Hospital."

-
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The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson against O'Connor and a codefendant, and awarded damages of $38, 500, including $10, 000 in pun7
1·t·1ve d amages . -/

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District
Court in a broad opinion dealing with "the far-reaching question whether
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons
involuntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals." 493 F. 2d, at
509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson's case, the
rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need of treatment, the
Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided. Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that, regardless
of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against
his will at a state mental institution has "a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to
be cured or to improve his mental condition." Id., at 520. Conversely,
the court's opinion implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat
his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to
himself or others.

~ ~dl.-)
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II.

We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional
law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case
in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have
a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether
the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a
single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man's constitutional right to liberty.
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson had not received treatment .JU' That verdict, based on abundant evidence, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may
be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such
a person--to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or
safety,~ or to alleviate or cure his illness. See Jackson v. Indiana,

-
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406 U.S. 715, 736-737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509. For

the jury found that none of the above grounds for continued confinement
10/
was present in Donaldson's case.-Given the jury's findings, what was left as justification for
keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law
may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not
itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement.
See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-721; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 248-250. Nor is it enough that Donaldson's
original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis,
if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially
permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer
existed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, supra.
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial
confinement. The term "mental illness" is notoriously vague and variable._!_.!/
To permit incarceration upon a criterion with such uncertain dimensions
invites evils too obvious to require cataloguing. See Papachristou v.

-
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City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156. But even assuming that the term
could be given a reasonably precise content and that the ''mentally ill"
could be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is no constitutional
basis for confining such persons against their will if they are dangerous
to no one and can live safely in freedom.
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them
a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community?
That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to
its unfortunate citizens goes without saying. But the mere presence of
mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to
the comforts of an institution.

Moreover, while the State may arguably

confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever
a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable
of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family
or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90. May the State

-
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fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
See, e. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21; Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 61 1, 615; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592;
cf. United States Dept. of Agric. v. Morenoz 413 U.S. 528, 534.
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of caring for himself or who
has -responsible family members or friends willing and able to care for
him. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O'Connor, as an
agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly concluded that O'Connor violated Donaldson's constitutional right to freedom.

III.
O'Connor contends that in any event he should not be held personally liable for monetary damages because his decisions were made
in "good faith." Specifically, O'Connor argues that he was acting pur suant
to state law which, he believed, authorized confinement of the mentally
ill even' when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute

-
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a danger to others, and that he could not reasonably have been expected
to know that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid.

A proposed instruction to this effect was rejected by the District Court. B_/
The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that
monetary damages could not be assessed against O'Connor if he had believed reasonably and in good faith that Donaldson's continued confinement
was "proper, " and that punitive damages could be awarded only if O'Connor
had acted "maliciously or wantonly or oppressively." The Court of Appeals
approved those instructions. But that court did not consider whether it
was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional instruction concerning
O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law authorization for Donaldson's
continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court's most recent decision on
the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42
U.S. C.

§

1983. Wood v. Strickland, _ _ U.S. _ _
Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether

O'Connor "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional
rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].''

-
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Id. _ _ . See also, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48; Wood v.
Strickland, supra, at ___ (opinion of Powell, J. ). For purposes of
this question, an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments. Wood v. Strickland, supra, at - Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in light of Wood
v. Strickland, whether the District Judge's failure to instruct on the
effect of O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate
the instructions given on O'Connor's liability for compensatory and punitive
damages .El
It is so ordered.

-
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-

Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class action

on behalf of all patients in his department of the Florida State Hospital
at Chattahoochee.

In addition to a damage claim, Donaldson's com-

plaint also requested habeas corpus relief directing his release, as well
as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further sought
declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate
psychiatric treatment.
After Donaldson's release and after the District Court dismissed
the action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating
his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended
complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, that
request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 512-513.
-

2/

The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to a

state statute which provided:
"Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally
incompetent requires confin~ment or restraint to prevent self-

-
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injury or violence to others, the said judge shall direct that
such person be forthwith delivered to the superintendent of
the Florida state hospital, for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in

§§

394. 09, 394. 24, 394. 25, 394. 26 and

394. 27, or make such other disposition of him as he may be
permitted by law."
14 A Fla. Sta t.

§

394. 22 (ll)(a) (West 1960).

Donaldson had been adjudged "incompetent" several days earlier
under

§

394. 22(1), which provided for such a finding as to any person

who was
"incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or
physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself
or managing his property, or is likely to dissipate or lose his
property or become the victim of designing persons, or inflict
harm on himself or others. . . . "
It would appear that

§

394. 22(ll)(a) contemplated that invol-

untary commitment would be imposed only on those "incompetent" persons
who "require[ d] confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence
to others." But this is not certain, for the statute further provided that

-
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the judge could adjudicate the person a "harmless incompetent" and release
him to · guardian upon a finding that he did "not require confinement or
restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others and that treatment
in the Florida state hospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit
to such person . . . . "

§

394. 22(11)(b) (emphasis added). In this regard,

it is noteworthy that Donaldson's "Order for Delivery" to the Florida State
Hospital provided that he required "confinement or restraint to prevent
self-injury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment." (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute apparently
provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could secure
his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerous to himself or
others.
Whether the Florida statute provided a "right to treatment"
for involuntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under
§

394. 22(11 )(a), commitment "to prevent self-injury or violence to others"

was "for care, maintenance, and treatment." Recently Florida has totally
revamped its civil commitment law and now provides a statutory right to
receive individual medical treatment. 144 Fla. Stat. Ann§ 394.459 (1972).

74-8 , O'Connor v. Donaldson
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The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial

reinstate ment of a patient's "mental competency." 14 A Fla. Stat.

§

394. 22

(15) & (16) (West 1960). But this procedure could be initiated by the
hospital staff. Indeed, it was at the staff's initiative that Donaldson was
finally restored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately after
O'Connor retired from the superintendency.
In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always
had its own procedure for releasing patients--for "trial visits," "home
visits," "furloughs," or "out of state discharges"--even though the patients
had -not been judicially restored to competency. Those conditional releases often became permanent, and the hospital merely closed its books
on the patient. O'Connor did not deny at trial that he had the power to
release patients; he conceded that it was his "duty" as superintendent of
the hospital "to determine whether that patient having once reached the
hospital was in such a condition as to request that he be considered for
release from the hospital. "
-

4/

There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a Christian

Scientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judge instructed
the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which
Donaldson had declined treatment.

-
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At the close of Donaldson's case-in-chief, O'Connor

moved for a directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time
of Donaldson's confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally
ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others. This motion
was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O'Connor asked that the
jury be instructed that "_if the defendants acted pursuant to a statute which
was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held accountable for such action." The District Court declined to give this requested
instruction.
-

6/

The District Court defined treatment as follows:
"Your are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does
have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve his mental condition."
(Emphasis added.)

O'Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patient has
a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousness to himself or others. But this is to take the above paragraph out of context, for

-
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it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial judge's theory that
treatment is constitutionally required only if mental illness alone, rather
than danger to self or others, is the reason for confinement. If O'Connor
had thought the instructions ambiguous on this point, he could have objected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We
accordingly have no occasion here to decide whetrer persons committed
on grounds of dangerousness enjoy a "right to treatment."
In pertinent part; the instructions read as follows:
"The Plaintiff claims in brief that throughout the period of his
hospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself, and claims
further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendants believed he was
mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to
improve his mental condition.
"The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff's detention was
legal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, it was
the result of mistake, without malicious intent.
"In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, the
burden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence in this case the following facts:
"That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous, or knowing that if mentally

-
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ill he was not receiving treatment for his mental illness. . . .
" [T]hat the Defendants' acts and conduct deprived Plaintiff of
his Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of his liberty
without due process of law as that phrase is defined and explained in these
instructions . . . .
"You are instructed that a person v.ho is involuntarily civilly
committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive
such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cur.ed or to
improve his mental condition.
" Now the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment
and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger
to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification
from a constitutional standpoint for continued confinement unless you
should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either to himself or
others."
-

7/

The trial judge had instructed that punitive damages should

be awarded only if "the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants
which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or wantorlly or oppressively done."

-
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Given the jury instructions, see note 6 supra, it is possible

that the jury went so far as to find that O'Connor knew that Donaldson
was not only harmless to himself and others but also that he was not
mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by the instructions to r~e against O'Connor regardless of the nature of the "treatment"
provided. If we were to construe the jury's verdict in that fashion, there
would remain no substa11tial issue in this case: That a wholly sane and
innocent person has a constitutional right not to be physically confined by
the State when his freedom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to
others cannot be seriously doubted.
-

9/

The judge's instructions used the phrase "danger to himself."

Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide,
a person is literally a "danger to himself" if for physical or other reasons
he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own
efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it
might be argued that the judge's instructions could have been more detailed
on this point, O'Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because
the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not a "danger to himself" however broadly that phrase might be defined.

-

-

74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson
FN - 9

10/

- - O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Court
must assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify
his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable"
question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession.
That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the sole asserted
ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest
that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is
present. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra. Neither party objected to the
jury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion
in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone,
can ·ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how
much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its
present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply
involuntary custodial confinement.
11 /

See, e.g., Sarbin, The Scientific Status of the Mental

Illness Metaphor, in Changing Perspectives in Mental Illness 1 (S. Plog &
R. Edgerton eds.); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications
for Civil Commitment, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 75, 80. See also, Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
1190, 1254-1256.

'
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See note 5 supra.
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only

the question whether O'Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages
for violating Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found,
on substantial evidence and adequate instructions, that O'Connor deprived
Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to liberty. Cf. note 8 supra.
That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds
that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the only issue to be
determined in that court will be whether O'Connor is immune from liability
for monetary damages.
Our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's
opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. Cf. United States v.
Munsingv.rear, 340 U.S. 36.
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June 20, 1975

Re:

No. 74-8 -

O'Connor v.

Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me.

Si/Z';J,
Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 74-8, O'Connor v. Donaldson

//
I propose to add the following to note 5 on page 13:
During his years of confinement, Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for
release from the Florida State Hospital on a number
of occasions. None of these claims was ever resolved on its merits, and no evidentiary hearings
were ever held. O'Connor has not contended that he
relied on these unsuccessful court actions as an
independent intervening re~son for continuing
Donaldson's confinement, and no instructions on this
score were requested.
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P. S.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 20, 1975
Re:

No. 74-8 - O'Connor v. Donaldson

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Sincerely,✓

l~

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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